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INTRODUCTION 
“There is something deeply humane about this policy, the idea 
that people have the right to be parents . . . . It’s something that 
characterizes life here: the value placed on life.”1 Israel is the world 
capital of in vitro fertilization (IVF).
2
 It is also one of the few 
countries where IVF and surrogacy are legally permitted, regulated 
on a national level, and administered by an administrative rather than 
a judicial authority.
3
 By contrast, in the United States, IVF, while 
widely available, is one area in which federalism reigns, producing a 
hodgepodge of state legislation and regulation.
4
 However, Israeli and 
American jurisprudence on this issue, though limited, far outstrips the 
 
† Senior Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2012–2013; J.D., University of 
Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, May 2013. The author wishes to thank her 
family and friends for their support, and Professor Jana Singer for her advice and 
enthusiasm. 
1. Dina Kraft, Where Families are Prized, Help is Free, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at 
A5.  
2. Id. (“Experts say Israel’s rate still far outstrips the rest of the world. Four percent of 
Israeli children today are the products of in-vitro fertilization, compared with about 1 percent 
estimated in the United States.”); see also John A. Collins, An International Survey of the 
Health Economics of IVF and ICSI, 8 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 265, 268 (2002) (including a 
survey in which Israel had the highest rate of IVF cycles per million population per annum). 
3. See infra Part I.B. 
4. See infra Part I.A. 
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current international dialogue, particularly in regard to the issue of 
frozen embryo disposition in cases of separation and divorce. While 
the international community recognized a right to family planning as 
early as the Teheran Conference of 1968,
5
 the cryopreservation of 
embryos and the issue of their “custody” is such a recent innovation 
that international law has not yet caught up with medical 
developments.
6
 Faced with a continually shifting philosophical 
debate as to the proper balance between culture-dictated morality and 
individual autonomy, the international community lacks consensus on 
how to approach assisted reproductive technologies (ART).
7
 At the 
heart of the problem as it pertains to frozen embryo disposition in 
cases of separation or divorce is the absence of an international 
definition of an embryo and its status (i.e., “person” or “property”), 
which leads to problems of judicial classification (e.g., whether to use 
contract law principles when interpreting disposition agreements).
8
  
 
5. International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, Iran, Apr. 22–May 13, 1968, 
Proclamation of Teheran, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.4 (Vol. 1/Part 1) (May 13, 1968) 
(“Considers that couples have a basic human right to decide freely and responsibly on the 
number and spacing of their children and a right to adequate education and information in 
this respect.”).  
6. The terms “embryo” and “frozen embryos” are used in this Comment for simplicity’s 
sake and not as a legal status judgment. In places where language from a case is cited 
directly, the term “pre-embryo” may be used. Scientifically, frozen embryos are in a pre-
embryonic state similar to a zygote. The first time a baby was successfully born from a 
cryopreserved embryo was in Melbourne, Australia in 1984. Before this point, IVF 
procedures were performed shortly after fertilization. See First Baby Born of Frozen 
Embryo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1984, at A16. 
7. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes “the right to share in 
scientific advancement and its benefits.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 27(1) (Dec. 10, 1948). Likewise, the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action notes, “Everyone has the right to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress and its applications.” World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 
1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 
12, 1993). It is notable that although both of the above declarations insist on the dignity and 
human rights of the individual, neither makes a direct connection to assisted reproductive 
technologies. 
8. Not even the term “reproductive rights” has an agreed-upon meaning in international 
dialogue. The African Charter on Human Rights specifically lists what it considers to be 
sexual and reproductive rights. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa art. 14, July 11, 2003, available at 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/. However, most documents referring to 
“reproductive rights” focus on family planning (“the right to decide the number and spacing 
of children”), female empowerment, and the right to privacy. See, e.g., Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
221; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination Against Women art. 16, 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. However, these sources do not address the dissolution of 
marriages or the increasing availability of assisted reproductive technologies. See generally 
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In the United States, the reproductive rights issue that continues 
to make the most noise, especially in presidential election years, is 
that of a woman’s right to have an abortion. Only six state supreme 
courts have actually considered cases involving frozen embryo 
disposition and divorce/separation.
9
 The lack of clarity and cohesion 
on this issue within the United States
10
 is mirrored internationally. 
For example, China officially maintains a “one-child” policy, but 
there is evidence that ART guidelines are being flouted, particularly 
by the wealthy.
11
 Other Western countries, including members of the 
European Union, exhibit the full spectrum of approaches to 
regulating ART.
12
 Even when countries such as Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom do regulate the cryopreservation of 
embryos, they have no case law on the particular point of frozen 
embryo disposition in cases of separation and divorce.
13
 Thus, in the 
 
Julia Gebhard & Diana Trimino, Reproductive Rights, International Regulation, in 8 THE 
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 930 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 
2012) (summarizing the extent of international initiatives and regulations in the area of 
reproductive rights). 
9. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 
1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 
(N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 
261 (Wash. 2002) (en banc). 
10. See infra Parts I.A.1, II.D. 
11. Though technically the Ministry of Health requires conformity of reproduction 
techniques with China’s “family planning policy,” surrogacy has become a way for the 
wealthy to bypass the one child restriction. While there is no specific law against surrogacy 
in China, the industry has operated in a gray area since 2001 when the Ministry of Health 
prohibited hospital-based surrogacy procedures and the commercial exchange of fertilized 
eggs and embryos. See Nicola Davison, China’s Surrogate Mothers See Business Boom in 
the Year of the Dragon, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20 
12/feb/08/china-surrogate-mothers-year-dragon. Scandal broke out in 2011 when it was 
discovered that a wealthy couple had eight babies, five via surrogacy. Due to the high cost of 
surrogacy (up to one million yuan), surrogacy tends to exacerbate the growing economic and 
social inequality in China’s population. See China Couple with Eight Babies Sparks 
Surrogacy Debate, BBCNEWS (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china 
-16275624; see also Shan Li, Chinese Couples Come to U.S. to Have Children Through 
Surrogacy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/19/business/la-fi-
china-surrogate-20120219. 
12. At one extreme, Germany prohibits cryopreservation of fertilized eggs and all forms 
of surrogacy. Kirsten Riggan, G12 Country Regulations of Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies, THE CTR. FOR BIOETHICS & HUM. DIGNITY (Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://cbhd.org/content/g12-country-regulations-assisted-reproductivetechnologies. At the 
other extreme, Belgium offers complete ART coverage through its national health plan. Id. 
In between, there are countries such as Spain where surrogacy is not recognized, but the 
commercial donation of gametes is allowed for purposes of ART and research. Id. 
13. See id. (indicating that both Sweden and Switzerland regulate for cryopreservation of 
embryos for up to five years); Human Fertilization & Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, 
§ 14(1)(d)(4) (U.K.) (stating that embryos may be stored for up to 5 years). However, most 
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area of frozen embryo disposition, while certain state practices and 
international human rights laws may reflect patterns that could form 
the basis of an international governance regime, it is not nearly 
consistent enough at present to rise to the level of customary law.
14
  
Israel remains the sole country, other than the United States, that 
has dealt with this particular reproductive repercussion of divorce. 
Israeli and American jurisprudence, though limited, addresses the full 
gamut of possible approaches, often covering similar territory such as 
equality of the sexes, the balance between constitutional and basic 
rights, the enforceability of agreements, and the scope of consent.
15
 
However, the two countries have reached opposite results, which is 
perhaps reflective of the personal and complex nature of the problem. 
The Israeli position, embodied in the seminal case of Nahmani v. 
Nahmani,
16
 promotes a presumption in favor of the party desiring 
implantation, while the American position, embodied in the Davis 
decision and five subsequent state supreme court cases,
17
 focuses on 
the autonomy of the individual and places the presumption squarely 
in favor of the party opposing parenthood.  
This Comment will tell the story of both seminal cases, focusing 
primarily on the courts’ conflicting views regarding rights-balancing 
and the application of contract law to the resolution of frozen embryo 
disposition disputes.
18
 My primary argument will be that, despite the 
holes in both countries’ jurisprudence and the vagueness of current 
international reproductive rights protections, a practical combination 
 
cases in the United Kingdom and Australia have dealt with post-death disposition, and not 
post-divorce disposition. See Jennifer Stolier, Disputing Frozen Embryos: Using 
International Perspectives to Formulate Uniform U.S. Policy, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
459, 474–79 (1991). 
14. See infra Parts I–II. 
15. See infra Part II. See generally Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); CFH 
2401/95 Nahmani v. Nahmani [1995-6] IsrLR 320 [1996] (Isr.). It is also worth noting here 
that both rounds of Nahmani in the Israeli Supreme Court occurred after the decision in 
Davis, and the Davis decision was both known and referred to by both the majority and 
minority judges on the Israeli bench. 
16. CFH 2401/95 Nahmani v. Nahmani [1995-6] IsrLR 320 [1996] (Isr.) [hereinafter 
Nahmani II]. This was the final hearing and decision in the Nahmani case. The first appeal to 
the Israeli Supreme Court, CA 5587/93 Nahmani v. Nahmani [1995-6] IsrLR 1 [1995] (Isr.), 
will be referred to throughout as Nahmani I. When referring to the Nahmani saga in 
aggregate, I will simply use “Nahmani.” The Israeli Supreme Court regularly refers to the 
two parties in this case as Ruth and Daniel. For the sake of consistency, I follow the court’s 
approach.  
17. See supra note 9.  
18. See infra Part II. 
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of the Israeli and American approaches could provide a solid 
foundation for international consensus on embryo “custody” and 
disposition.  
As a possible solution, I intend to offer the following 
compromise position that pulls elements from both Davis and 
Nahmani. Ideally, the state/judiciary would stay out of this type of 
intimate family issue. However, in view of the State’s interest in the 
health and welfare of its citizens, the couple’s interest in making a 
sound decision, as well as the prevention of medical malpractice, a 
standard framework should exist for disposition agreements. Such 
agreements should bear a presumption of validity and enforceability 
and be modifiable by mutual consent.
19
 In the absence of prior 
agreement, and despite the other party’s present objection, 
implantation should be allowed within a medically reasonable time 
(limiting the amount of time the embryos can be preserved), so long 
as the party desiring implantation has no alternative means of 
achieving parenthood (genetic or adoptive)
20
 and agrees to take full 
legal responsibility for any resultant child. Should the disputing 
parties reconcile after the birth of the resultant child, the party who 
opposed implantation should be required to adopt the child in order to 
secure legal parenthood. In cases where there is no such 
reconciliation or adoption by the “biological” parent, the child born 
of the disputed embryo will not be allowed to inherit from their 
“biological” parent—just as they typically cannot from a sperm or 
egg donor—nor will the “biological” parent retain any legal 
responsibility in the case of the death or incapacity of the child’s 
legal parent.
21
  
 
 
19. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
20. In the final disposition of the Davis case, Mary Sue wanted to donate, rather than 
implant, the embryos into herself or a surrogate. Id. at 590. I refrain from addressing 
donation scenarios in my principal argument because both parties lose control/custody in a 
donation scenario, and donation is an area where Nahmani and Davis do not provide an 
appropriate foundation for international consensus. The Davis court itself indicated that its 
decision might have been closer had Mary Sue desired implantation for herself. Id. at 604. 
21. However, note the recent case of a Kansas sperm donor being sued for child support. 
Kansas: Sperm Donor is Ordered to Pay Support, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 2013, at A13; Pia 
Gadkari, Should Sperm Donors have Parental Duties?, BBCNEWS (Feb. 19, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21482099. 
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I. THE CASES: COMPLEX PROCEDURAL HISTORY MEETS UNIQUE 
CULTURAL CONTEXT 
Davis and Nahmani were both watershed cases in their 
respective countries. However, the breadth and variety of the 
opinions issued by each country’s judicial system, as well as the lack 
of subsequent jurisprudence, tempered Davis and Nahmani’s 
influence. Moreover, both high courts faced complicated fact patterns 
in these cases of first impression. First, there was no prior agreement 
regarding embryo disposition in either case. Second, by the end of the 
proceedings, the Davises were both remarried and no longer wanted 
to use the embryos themselves,
22
 while the Nahmanis were still 
married to each other (though leading separate lives)
23
 and Ruth 
Nahmani still intended to have the embryos implanted in a surrogate 
in the United States and raise any resultant children herself.
24
 Lastly, 
while the Davises and Daniel Nahmani had reproductive alternatives 
available to them, the use of her frozen embryos was Ruth’s last 
chance at motherhood, genetic or otherwise.
25
 The two courts would 
eventually choose to start from different premises and with different 
priorities: in the Israeli courts, Ruth’s desire to achieve biological 
parenthood would be accorded special weight, whilst in Tennessee 
and indeed in post-Davis jurisprudence, the autonomy of the party 
not desiring parenthood took precedence.
26
 
A.  Davis v. Davis 
1. A Preliminary Note on ART in the United States  
Contrary to the systematic and national approach employed by 
Israel, IVF is one area in which U.S. federalism holds almost 
monopolistic sway, producing a patchwork of legislation and 
regulation that varies from state to state.
27
 The U.S. system, in which 
 
22. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590. 
23. See Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 9. 
24. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 9. 
25. In view of her age and the strictness of Israeli adoption rules, adoption was an 
unlikely alternative. The Israeli Supreme Court did not even contemplate this option in its 
decision except to categorize adoption as an “unattractive” option. Nahmani I, [1995-6] 
IsrLR at 43–44. 
26. See supra note 9. 
27. See Ellen Waldman, Cultural Priorities Revealed: The Development and Regulation 
of Assisted Reproduction in the United States and Israel, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 69, 88 
(2006). At least three states have enacted legislation addressing frozen embryos. Roman v. 
Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 44 n.6 (Tex. App. 2006) (“FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (couples must 
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healthcare is not treated as a universal right, is characterized by high 
cost, limited assistance from government or from insurance 
companies, and conflicting jurisprudence.
28
 Even as late as 2006, less 
than a quarter of states required insurers to provide some form of 
ART coverage.
29
 However, even though the financial burden is high, 
if an individual has the financial means to use ART, she does not 
have to go through the State intrusions involved in the Israeli 
process.
30
 For example, in the American system, the payor has more 
choice regarding donor sperm and is not subjected to an evaluation 
conducted by a social worker.
31
 The Davis case was an early 
illustration of this uniquely American combination of accessibility to 
ART and the pitfalls of a patchwork regulatory system.
32
 
2. The Story of Davis v. Davis 
This case arose from the divorce proceedings of Junior and Mary 
Sue Davis.
33
 At issue was the disposition of seven frozen embryos in 
 
execute written agreement providing for disposition in event of death, divorce or other 
unforeseen circumstances); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168–B:13–168–B:15, 168–B:18 
(couples must undergo medical examinations and counseling; 14–day limit for maintenance 
of ex utero pre-zygotes); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121–9:133 (pre-zygote considered 
“juridical person” that must be implanted) . . . .”). As noted in the Introduction to this 
Comment and as will be discussed later, the existing jurisprudence is not much more 
extensive: only six state supreme courts and five state appellate courts have addressed frozen 
embryo disputes, with no federal legislation. For a complete list, see supra note 9. The only 
applicable statements made by the U.S. Supreme Court is that the right to procreational 
autonomy is a basic civil right, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and the fetus 
is not a human being under the Constitution, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). By 
extension, a frozen embryo would not be a person under the Constitution. 
28. Waldman, supra note 27, at 87–88. 
29. Id. at 88. 
30. For a description of the Israeli process, see id. at 85. For the U.S. equivalent, see id. 
at 90. 
31. Id. at 90. Despite this seemingly greater access to IVF, single and lesbian women in 
the United States face a more precarious legal situation in the United States than do their 
counterparts in Israel; even though some states have extended their parentage statutes to 
protect unmarried women, some courts have overridden their state legislatures, invoking the 
values of a traditional two-parent family in the face of a woman’s intent. See Melissa E. 
Fraser, Note, Gender Inequality in In Vitro Fertilization: Controlling Women's Reproductive 
Autonomy, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 183, 197–98 (1998) (discussing limitations on lesbians’ 
access to IVF programs). There is also a campaign in certain states such as Louisiana and 
North Dakota to define a “person” to include a fetus, contrary to the default position in most 
Western legal systems. See Movement to Treat Fetuses as People Gains Ground, THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE (June 4, 2011), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/06/movement_to_ 
treat_fetuses_as_p.html. 
32. See infra Part I.A.2. 
33. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992). 
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cryogenic storage.
34
 During their nine-year marriage, Mary Sue 
underwent multiple unsuccessful IVF procedures as well as five tubal 
pregnancies and a failed adoption.
35
 In December 1988, the Davises 
tried the cryopreservation technique for the first time.
36
 Two of the 
fertilized ova were unsuccessfully implanted in Mary Sue and the 
remaining seven were placed in cryogenic storage for future 
implantation.
37
 At the time of the procedure, the Davises were 
informed that the likely storage life for the frozen embryos was two 
years and that they could donate the remaining embryos to another 
couple.
38
 The Davises made no decision on donation at this time, nor 
did they sign any agreement with the clinic.
39
 In fact, the record 
failed to indicate whether the Davises ever considered a contingency 
agreement.
40
 At trial, the spouses disputed the status of their marriage 
at the time of the final implantation attempt.
41
  
During the initial round of litigation, Mary Sue requested 
custody of the frozen embryos for implantation in herself, while 
Junior preferred their maintenance in a frozen state.
42
 The trial judge 
granted the divorce and awarded custody of the frozen embryos to 
Mary Sue.
43
 For Judge Young, the primary issue was whether the 
Davises had accomplished their intent to produce a human being.
44
 
To that end, Judge Young chose to emphasize the status of the 
embryo as that of a human being (as opposed to property).
45
 He also 
applied the doctrines of parens patriae and “best interests of the 
child” to the case: as the embryos are human beings, it follows that 
 
34. Id. 
35. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *2 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), 
rev’d, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff’d, 842 S.W.2d 588 
(Tenn. 1992). 
36. Id. at *3. 
37. Id.  
38. Id.  
39. Id. 
40. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592. 
41. Id. Junior Davis testified that he was aware that the marriage was unstable for at least 
a year but “hoped that the birth of a child would improve their relationship.” Id. Mary Sue 
Davis testified to having no knowledge of any problems in the marriage. Id. According to the 
record, a tentative plan existed to implant at least another one of the cryopreserved embryos 
in Mary Sue in March or April 1989. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *3. Junior filed the original 
divorce complaint. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589. 
42. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589. 
43. Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *1. 
44. Id. at *3. 
45. Id. at *4. 
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their best interest is to be given to Mary Sue for implantation, thereby 
accomplishing the Davises’ original purpose.46 
Junior Davis appealed the decision to the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals.
47
 By this time, Mary Sue was domiciled in Florida and 
preferred to donate the frozen embryos to a childless couple.
48
 The 
court of appeals reversed the trial court, emphasizing that the issue 
was one of control rather than custody, and that the Davises had a 
joint interest and an equal voice in the disposition of the frozen 
embryos.
49
 The court of appeals also held that according sole custody 
to Mary Sue would constitute impermissible state action and would 
violate Junior’s constitutionally protected right not to be forced into 
parenthood.
50
 The court of appeals further observed that it would be 
equally inappropriate and inequitable to order Mary Sue to implant 
the ova against her will as it would be to order Junior to suffer the 
consequences of forced paternity.
51
 
Mary Sue next petitioned for review by the Tennessee Supreme 
Court, which decided to hear the case (1) because of the case’s 
importance in the development of the law of reproductive 
technologies, and (2) because it felt that the court of appeals had 
failed to provide sufficient guidance to the lower courts in the event 
of continued disagreement of the parties.
52
 By the time of the hearing 
before the Tennessee Supreme Court, both parties were remarried and 
neither wanted the embryos for themselves.
53
  
According to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the essential dispute 
was not the “status” of the embryos54 or how long to store embryos, 
 
46. Id. at *11. 
47. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff’d, 
842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
48. Id. at *1 n.1. Junior wanted to discard the frozen embryos. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.  
49. Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *3. 
50. Id. at *2. 
51. Id. at *3. 
52. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590. 
53. Id. Mary Sue preferred to donate the embryos and Junior preferred to discard them. 
Id. Junior Davis’ new spouse was infertile. Brenda L. Henderson, Achieving Consistent 
Disposition of Frozen Embryos in Marital Dissolution under Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REV. 
549, 550 n.5 (1992). Between the appellate court’s decision and the supreme court hearing, 
Junior Davis expressed an interest in having at least one of the frozen embryos implanted in 
a surrogate. Mark Curriden, Joint Custody of the Frozen Seven, 76 A.B.A. J. 36, 36 (1990). 
54. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594. The Tennessee Supreme Court dismissed the lower courts’ 
consideration of status, declaring that the issue was not dispositive in this case. Id. The court 
agreed to address the question solely as a result of the requests of various amici curiae. Id. 
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but “whether the parties would become parents.”55 The Tennessee 
Supreme Court found the answer in the constitutional right to 
privacy.
56
 For the purposes of the case before it, the court concluded 
that the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights (to 
procreation and to avoid procreation) that are both subject to various 
protections and limitations.
57
 The Davises, as equivalent gamete-
providers, constituted the sole interested parties in the continuation or 
termination of the process; the State, lacking a public policy interest 
specifically in this area, cannot interfere.
58
 
In reaching its decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court first 
highlighted the absence of a written agreement and the lack of a 
relevant state statute in the case.
59
 It then declined to implement any 
of the bright-line models proposed by scholars for resolving such 
disputes, opting instead for an interest-balancing test in disputes 
between progenitors where no prior agreement exists.
60
 In this case, 
the court held that, absent an agreement between the parties, the 
Knoxville Fertility Clinic should be allowed to follow its normal 
procedures for the disposal of surplus or unwanted frozen embryos as 
long as it did not conflict with the court’s opinion.61 Applying the 
interest-balancing test to the facts at hand, the court emphasized the 
psychological and financial consequences of unwanted parenthood 
that would be placed on Junior and, in the opposite case, Mary’s 
 
The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that frozen embryos could 
not be considered “persons” under Tennessee law, but it disagreed with the court of appeals’ 
award of “joint custody” because the term implied a property interest. Id. at 597. This, the 
court said, went too far. Id. at 595. The court concluded that the frozen embryos were neither 
persons nor property, that they occupy an “interim category that entitles them to special 
respect because of their potential for human life.” Id. at 597. 
55. Id. at 598. 
56. Id. This right is implied by both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Tennessee 
Constitution, Art. I, § 8, and it encompasses the right to procreate, or procreational 
autonomy. The court cited U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, including Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in concluding that the right to procreational autonomy was 
included in the right to privacy, though its scope remains unclear. Id. at 600.  
57. Id. at 601. 
58. Id. at 601–02. 
59. Id. at 590. 
60. Id. at 590–91. The court adopted the following approach: first, ascertain the 
preferences of the progenitors. In case of a dispute, use a prior agreement between the 
parties. If no prior agreement exists, then employ an interest-balancing test. The objecting 
party will normally prevail if the other party has other reasonable alternatives for achieving 
parenthood. In no case should there be an automatic veto. Id. at 604. 
61. Id. at 605.  
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knowledge that the IVF procedure had been futile.
62
 Donation would 
also cause Junior to lose both procreational autonomy and a potential 
relationship with his biological children.
63
 The court concluded that 
Junior had the stronger interest.
64
 
The most important issue that the Tennessee Supreme Court 
addressed, at least according to the frequency with which later courts 
(including both Nahmani panels) referenced it, was one that the 
parties failed to raise on appeal: whether the Davises could have 
made a valid contingency agreement and whether that agreement 
would now be enforceable.
65
 The supreme court reasoned that an 
agreement should be presumed valid and enforceable and that any 
modifications should be made by mutual agreement.
66
 In the absence 
of modifications, the initial agreement would remain binding.
67
 
Upon rehearing, the main issue before the Tennessee Supreme 
Court was what guidance to give Junior Davis and the clinic director, 
Dr. King, as to the final disposition of the frozen embryos.
68
 The 
clinic’s normal procedure was donation, the exact disposition Junior 
sought to avoid.
69
 The court concluded that if the parties could agree, 
the frozen embryos should be donated for research purposes; if not, 
then the clinic was permitted to discard the frozen embryos.
70
 The 
court granted Junior Davis’ petition and remanded the specific issue 
to the trial court for an appropriate conforming order.
71
 
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case.
72
 
 
 
62. Id. at 603–04. 
63. Id. at 604. 
64. Id. The court conceded, however, that the case would have been closer if Mary Sue 
were still seeking implantation. Id. 
65. The court decided that even without the issue being raised, it was clearly important to 
address it so as to give guidance to the lower courts for future interpretations. Id. at 597. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. According to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the court of appeals had failed to 
provide a formula for a situation in which there is no initial agreement and no subsequent 
agreement; its ruling in effect gave Junior Davis an absolute veto, assuring the destruction of 
the frozen embryos due to their limited shelf-life. Id. at 598. 
68. Davis v. Davis, No. 34, 1992 WL 341632, at *1 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992). 
69. Id. at *1. 
70. Id. at *2. 
71. Id. 
72. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993). Mary Sue Davis (now Stowe) was the 
Petitioner. 
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B.  Nahmani v. Nahmani 
1. A Preliminary Note on Israel’s Reproductive Culture 
Israel is “unapologetically pro-natalist.”73 All Israeli women,74 
no matter their sexual orientation or marital status, are afforded 
access to IVF for up to two children at little to no cost. In fact, IVF is 
included in Israel’s National Health Plan, instituted in 1996,75 and 
ART is one area of Israeli life in which religious and secular law and 
attitudes converge.
76
 The high value placed on life leads to significant 
support for an individual’s right to be a parent.77 Indeed, the State’s 
efforts over the last sixty years have transformed procreation from a 
“private life quest into a public works project.”78  
2. The Unique Case of Nahmani v. Nahmani 
Ruth and Daniel Nahmani married in March 1984.
79
 In 1987, 
Ruth underwent a necessary operation that resulted in infertility.
80
 
The following year, the couple decided to attempt IVF, implanting 
the fertilized ova in a surrogate mother. However, in the late 1980s, 
Israel’s Public Health Regulations precluded the implantation of ova 
into one other than the intended mother of the child.
81
 To comply 
with Israeli regulations and to cut costs, the Nahmanis decided to 
conduct the fertilization in Israel and the surrogacy in the United 
 
73. Waldman, supra note 27, at 68. 
74. All citizens of Israel, whether Jewish, Arab, or other, have the same rights to state 
fertility treatments. Id. at 82; Kraft, supra note 1. This benefit also applies to both married 
and single women. Waldman, supra note 27, at 82. In fact, single parents receive a number 
of state subsidies to make child-rearing feasible. Id.  
75. Waldman, supra note 27, at 82–83. 
76. Kraft, supra note 1. 
77. See id. (“There is even a growing pool of single religious women using in-vitro 
fertilization, the efforts sanctioned by rabbis.”). Unlike some countries, in Israel, single 
parenthood is not stigmatized. Instead, it is seen as a life choice consistent with the national 
procreation plan. See Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 47–48 (“One parent-families are 
accepted in our society with understanding and even entitled to various forms of 
assistance.”). According to some scholars, this sanctification of child-bearing has multiple 
historical and cultural antecedents: the Jewish people’s covenant with God, the pressure to 
replace the lost generation of the Holocaust, and concerns about the increasing rate of 
intermarriage. Id.; see also infra Parts I.B.2., II; Waldman, supra note 27, at 70–75 
(discussing the effect of Israeli culture on access to reproductive technology).  
78. Waldman, supra note 27, at 87. 
79. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 8. 
80. Id. 
81. Public Health (In Vitro Fertilization) Regulations, 1987, KT 5035, 978 (Isr.), 
reprinted in 14 ANN. REV. POPULATION L. 347 (1987) [hereinafter Public Health Regs.]. 
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States.
82
 However, in order to obtain the consent of the Israeli 
hospital, the Nahmanis had to petition the Israeli Supreme Court for 
permission to proceed with their plan, which the court granted in 
1991.
83
 The Nahmanis completed the fertilization procedure, but in 
1992, before they could proceed with the surrogate arrangement, 
Daniel Nahmani left Ruth for another woman.
84
 Ruth applied to 
Assuta Hospital for the release of the fertilized ova in order to 
continue with the surrogacy process.
85
 Daniel opposed this action in 
writing, both to Assuta Hospital and to the American surrogacy 
clinic.
86
 Ruth then filed an action in the Haifa district court
87
 in order 
to obtain the ova’s release and the non-interference of Daniel.88 The 
trial judge, Justice H. Ariel, found in Ruth’s favor, relying on 
contract law principles to hold that Daniel’s consent at the beginning 
of the process included consent for all stages of IVF; once the process 
began, he could no longer revoke his consent.
89
 The judge further 
asserted that Daniel could not rely on a “change in circumstances” 
argument as he was the one who instigated the change.
90
  
a. The First Hearing before the Supreme Court of Israel 
Daniel appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of Israel.
91
 
Sitting as the court of appeals, a five-judge panel reversed the district 
 
82. Surrogacy was not permitted in Israel at this time. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 8. At 
the time of the litigation central to this Comment, there existed only a financial agreement 
between the Nahmanis and the American surrogacy clinic that did not include contingencies. 
No surrogate had yet been chosen, though testimony suggested that the Nahmanis had seen 
an example of a surrogate agreement. Id. 
83. HCJ 1237/91 [1991] (Isr.); see also Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 8. 
84. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 8. This woman was not part of any of the litigation 
between the Nahmanis, though she had children with Daniel. Id. In fact, the Nahmanis never 
legally separated or divorced. Id. at 8–9. The Haifa Rabbinical Court recommended 
reconciliation but it never happened. Id. at 9. Therefore, the Nahmanis continued to be 
married throughout the course of the litigation discussed here. 
85. Id. at 9.  
86. Id.  
87. The text of this decision is unavailable. A summary of this opinion is found in 
Nahmani I. 
88. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 9. 
89. Id. The court analogized the Nahmani situation to abortion cases: the husband does 
not have the right to prevent an abortion or force pregnancy on a woman, so Daniel should 
not have the right to stop the IVF/surrogacy procedure once the ova had been fertilized. Id. at 
17. The court also worried that if the husband always won in these cases, he would have a 
trump card in marriage and in dissolution proceedings, a powerful veto on the rights of his 
wife. Id. at 9. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 9. 
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court’s ruling by a 4-1 margin.92 The majority, led by Justice 
Strasberg-Cohen, framed the issue as whether a woman has the right 
to take possession of ova that were removed from her body and that 
were artificially inseminated with the sperm of her husband for the 
purpose of implanting them in a surrogate mother, when the husband 
opposes the procedure.
93
 The court’s analysis is focused on balancing 
the rights of the parties and the enforceability (or unenforceability) of 
the couple’s agreement to pursue IVF and surrogacy. Though 
acknowledging that Ruth’s right to be a parent is a basic right, the 
court observed that this right did not include an obligation on Daniel 
to help realize that right (i.e., “no forced parenthood”).94 Applying 
the fundamental Israeli legal principle of equality of the sexes, the 
majority concluded that the legal enforcement of unwanted 
parenthood would be improper and in violation of Daniel’s 
procreational autonomy, not to mention void as against public 
policy.
95
 On contractual grounds, the majority concluded that 
Daniel’s “consent” amounted merely to an unenforceable “weak” 
agreement that did not imply consent to a continuation of the 
procedure in case of separation.
96
 The majority also rejected the 
district court’s interpretation of Daniel’s consent and its reading of 
the Public Health Regulations as having gone too far.
97
 
Out of sympathy for Ruth’s situation,98 the majority also took the 
time to address—though it eventually dismissed—several additional 
claims outside the scope of its primary holdings: estoppel, difficulties 
of IVF procedure, alternative possibilities for motherhood, “status” of 
fertilized ova, and “best interests of the child.”99 The majority 
dismissed the first argument on the grounds that there was no 
promise or representation upon which Ruth could rely, and that initial 
consent to the procedure does not equal consent to the procedure’s 
 
92. Id. at 49. 
93. Id. at 5. 
94. Id. at 19. For the majority, the rights to be a parent and not to be parent were (as in 
Davis) two sides of the same coin, two constitutional rights derived from the right to 
freedom and self-fulfillment. Id. at 16. 
95. Id. at 18 (“The imposition of parenthood is contrary to ‘public policy’ and proper 
legal policy, in that it is inconsistent with the basic values protected by our legal system.”). 
The court also held that irrevocable consent to being a parent amounts to a full and eternal 
waiver of the right not to be a parent, thus constituting a waiver of a basic right. Id. at 19. 
96. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 29–30. 
97. Id. at 22–23. 
98. Id. at 48. 
99. Id. at 41–48. 
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continuation/completion even in the case of separation.
100
 Strasberg-
Cohen dismissed the next two claims as unavailable because Ruth did 
not have the right to impose the duty of parenthood on Daniel.
101
 
Regarding “status,” the majority concluded that Jewish, Israeli, and 
Western law all pointed toward the lack of an independent right to 
life for the ova; thus, neither the “parents” nor the State have a duty 
to continue the procedure.
102
 Lastly, the majority concluded that the 
“best interests of the child” standard would not preclude relief in this 
case, were relief available.
103
 
By contrast, the sole dissenting opinion began with a declaration 
that no legal norm existed that would be applicable to the present 
situation and the enforcement of the obligations at issue.
104
 
Overcoming that objection,
105
 Justice Tal responded point by point to 
Justice Strasberg-Cohen. For Justice Tal, the heart of the issue was 
the enforcement of obligations derived specifically from fatherhood 
rather than the general enforcement of parenthood.
106
 Similar to the 
majority, Justice Tal then proceeded to discuss the balance of rights 
and even agreed that the right to non-parenthood was a basic right.
107
 
He also agreed that, in an ideal situation, there would be joint and 
continuing consent, with the parties knowing ab initio the 
consequence of their consent.
108
 However, Justice Tal also observed 
that not only was this a unique case,
109
 but that Daniel’s right to non-
parenthood was not absolute. In fact, for Justice Tal, the debate was 
 
100. Id. at 41–42. As Strasberg-Cohen noted, estoppel cannot magically override contract 
law, general law, and public policy. Id. 
101. Id. at 43–44. 
102. Id. at 44–46.  
103. Id. at 47–48. The majority opinion reasoned that were relief otherwise available, the 
resultant child would have two parents who were married at the time of creation. Id. 
Furthermore, the court noted that one-parent families were relatively common in Israel, and 
not ostracized. Id. 
104. Id. at 50 (Tal, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is not always only one legal solution . . . where 
there is such a competition, we should, in my opinion, prefer the solution that appears to be 
more just.”). 
105. Id. at 49–50 (“But society has no tools for making decisions and enforcing them in 
the moral and social sphere, so it leaves the problem for the court to solve.”). On rehearing, 
Justice Tal addressed the lack of a governing legal principle in his discussion of how a court 
can “develop the law.” Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 357–58 (Tal, J.). 
106. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 52 (Tal, J., dissenting) (“In other words, is it proper to 
allow the biological procedure to continue, when at the end of it, if it is successful, it will 
impose an emotional burden and financial obligations on [Daniel], against his will.”). 
107. Id. at 50. 
108. Id. at 62. 
109. Id.  
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between the “two evils” of forced parenthood (an inconvenience) and 
infertility (violation of a basic, fundamental right).
110
 According to 
Justice Tal, while both decisions will result in one of these two evils, 
infertility denies the woman her fundamental right to be a parent and 
thus trumps any right belonging to the husband.
111
 In terms of 
consent, Justice Tal relied heavily on the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel and returned to the trial court’s argument that the original 
consent was sufficient to act as consent to the final goal (having a 
child).
112
 Ruth relied on Daniel’s original consent, and based on this 
consent she irrevocably changed her situation by undergoing the 
procedure and using her husband’s sperm to fertilize the eggs.113 
Again agreeing with the district court judge, Justice Tal concluded 
that Daniel was estopped both from objecting to the continuation of 
the procedure and to arguing a “change in circumstances.”114 
Furthermore, since the Nahmanis were still married, Justice Tal 
thought that the court should have been concerned with compelling 
Daniel to carry out his moral obligations to Ruth under Jewish law.
115
 
b. The Supreme Court of Israel Rehears Nahmani 
Ruth Nahmani petitioned the court for rehearing. Because of the 
novelty of the case, the Israeli Supreme Court granted the rehearing 
and assigned it to an unprecedented eleven-judge panel.
116
 By a 7-4 
majority, the court reversed its previous opinion and granted the 
 
110. Id. at 53.  
111. Id.  
112. Id. at 56–57. 
113. Id. at 54.  
114. Id. at 57 (“[S]omeone who effects a change cannot argued that he is entitled to 
benefit of the change that he himself made, to the detriment of the other party.”). 
115. Id. at 60. 
116. Dalia Dorner, Human Reproduction: Reflections on the Nachmani Case, 35 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2000). In fact, the Nahmani case marked the first time that the Israeli Court 
granted a second hearing on a case previously heard by a panel of more than three judges. 
Janie Chen, Note, The Right to Her Embryos: An Analysis of Nahmani v. Nahmani and its 
Impact on Israeli In Vitro Fertilization Law, 7 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325, 335 
(1999). At the time the case was re-opened, both Daniel and Ruth Nahmani spoke to the 
press, Ruth expressing hope that she could still have a child, and Daniel expressing 
disappointment as a citizen of a democratic country. Naomi Segal, Israeli Supreme Court 
Reconsiders the Fate of Frozen Embryos, JWEEKLY.COM (Sept. 15, 1995), 
http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/1591/israeli-supreme-court-reconsiders-the-fate-of-froze 
n-embryos/. 
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fertilized ova to Ruth.
117
 Reflecting the complicated and novel nature 
of the subject matter, all eleven justices chose to write an opinion.
118
 
The new seven-judge majority now held that an individual’s 
interest in refusing parenthood could not be of primary concern 
because the absence of parenthood lacks inherent value.
119
 Despite 
some sympathy for Daniel, the court felt that Ruth’s right to realize 
parenthood took precedence.
120
 The majority relied on a number of 
arguments, many of which were previously addressed by Justice Tal 
in the first hearing: promissory estoppel, Jewish heritage, the weight 
of ethical justice in favor of granting parenthood, the primacy of the 
wish to create life, and the balance of “evils” (infertility vs. financial 
obligations).
121
 By contrast, the dissent, led by Justice Strasberg-
Cohen, focused on the contract law elements of the case: (1) the 
scope of consent and its revocability; and (2) the validity of a 
partially-implemented agreement between the couple.
122
 The dissent 
argued that the situation did not meet the requirements for promissory 
estoppel, and that while there was an agreement, the consent lasted 
only as long as the family unit was intact.
123
 Moreover, Israeli 
regulations
124
 and public policy dictated that there be continuing 
mutual consent of both spouses at every stage of the IVF 
procedure.
125
 
No subsequent jurisprudence exists on this issue in the Israeli 
Supreme Court. 
 
 
117. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 321–23. Majority opinions: Justices Tal, Dorner, 
Goldberg, Kedmi, Türkel, and Bach. Minority opinions: Justices Strasberg-Cohen, Or, and 
Zamir. President Barak joined the minority opinion. 
118. For the sake of brevity, a short summary of the main points is inserted here. Details 
of the various justices’ opinions will appear throughout the analysis section of this 
Comment. See infra Part II. 
119. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 359 (Tal, J.). 
120. See generally Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 355–444. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 327–55 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting); id. at 444–58 (Or, J., dissenting); id. 
at 458–82 (Zamir, J., dissenting); id. at 483–88 (Barak, President, dissenting). 
123. See, e.g., Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 342–43 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting); 
Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 456–57 (Or, J., dissenting). 
124. See Public Health Regs., supra note 81. 
125. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 346–47 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting). 
13-Breen-Portnoy 9/6/2013  12:03 PM 
292 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 28:275 
 
II. DAVIS AND NAHMANI: RIGHTS, CONTRACTS, AND THE POTENTIAL 
FOR INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 
In an ideal world, couples would make written provision for any 
and all contingencies regarding the disposition of frozen embryos 
before commencing the IVF process. In case of separation or divorce, 
this written agreement would ideally help avoid many of the issues 
the courts see today. The extent of any consent would have been 
stipulated at the beginning, and the terms would define whether the 
initial consent of both parties refers to the entire procedure through 
implantation or is merely a renewable and revocable type of consent 
to be determined at each stage of the process. 
However, as duly noted by many of the justices on the Israeli 
Supreme Court and by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, this is not an 
ideal world. Both the Davises and the Nahmanis failed to present a 
concrete contractual claim because neither couple signed an 
agreement with their respective fertility or surrogacy clinics, and 
clearly the couples could not agree on whether even an oral 
agreement existed between spouses.
126
 The contractual element thus 
spawned in the courts a multi-faceted discussion of implied consent, 
clarity of intent, and the legitimate expectations of the parties. 
Additionally, in the absence of an agreement and in the absence of a 
clear precedential deference to principles of contract law, both courts 
addressed at length the competing rights of the parties.
127
  
The extensive discussions of both courts provide a one-stop shop 
for international negotiators seeking a comprehensive summary of the 
principal arguments and points of dispute in the debate over frozen 
embryo disposition in case of divorce. Both Nahmani and Davis 
address the two principal elements of the debate—rights and 
contracts—from a variety of angles. Combining the most practical of 
their findings would create the foundation for a successful 
national/international framework. Though both courts preferred that 
the state/judiciary stay out of such intimate family issues, they also 
realized that non-involvement was impractical and actually 
impossible in situations of such intense disagreement. In view of the 
State’s interest in the health and welfare of its citizens, the State 
should encourage the execution of agreements that provide for the 
 
126. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590, 598 (Tenn. 1992); Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR 
at 8. 
127. See infra Part II.A. 
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disposition of pre-embryos in the case of separation or divorce and 
promote the creation of uniform standards to aid couples in the 
decision-making process. Such agreements should bear a 
presumption of validity and enforceability and be modifiable by 
mutual consent.
128
 In the absence of prior agreement, implantation 
should be allowed within a medically reasonable time (limiting the 
amount of time the embryos can be preserved), so long as the party 
desiring implantation has no alternative means of achieving 
parenthood (genetic or adoptive)
129
 and agrees to take full legal 
responsibility for any resultant child.
130
  
A. The Rights Debate 
A major compromise that the international community could 
make in favor of efficiency and clarity would be to eschew the 
interest or rights-balancing test where an agreement exists between 
the parties. The balance of rights discussion is more an 
ideological/philosophical issue rather than a practical issue: while the 
American justice system provokes a more constitution-based 
discussion on the issue of rights,
131
 the Israeli justices in Nahmani 
freely roamed the question’s existential limits.132 At a minimum, the 
adoption of a presumption of contractual enforceability, presented as 
a natural outgrowth of the existing jurisprudence, might encourage 
other countries to agree to an expansion of the existing framework for 
the protection of individuals’ family planning rights.133 
 
128. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 
129. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
130. Another viable proposal takes into account the potential reconciliation of the parties. 
Should the disputing parties reconcile after the birth of the resultant child, the party who 
opposed implantation should be required to adopt the child in order to secure legal 
parenthood. In cases where there is no such reconciliation or adoption, the child born of the 
disputed embryo will not be allowed to inherit from their “biological” non-consenting 
parent, just as they cannot from a sperm or egg donor, nor will the “biological” parent retain 
any legal responsibility in the case of the death or incapacity of the child’s legal parent. 
131. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598–603. This is not surprising given the supremacy of the 
U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights in the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
By contrast, Israel relies on a series of Basic Laws in lieu of a written constitution. The first 
Basic Law was enacted in 1958. Basic Law: The Knesset, 5718-1958 SH No. 244 (Isr.). The 
most recent Basic Law was enacted in 2001. Basic Law: The Government, 5761-2001 SH 
No. 1780 (Isr.). The full text of the Basic Laws is available at the Knesset’s website: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_yesod1.htm (last visited May 22, 
2013). 
132. See, e.g., Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 355–73 (Tal, J.); Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR 
at 424–44 (Mazza, J.).  
133. See supra notes 5, 7–8 and accompanying text. 
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Unlike the Nahmani II court, the Davis court did not consider 
itself faced with a normative vacuum in approaching this case of first 
impression. While not explicitly found in either the Federal or 
Tennessee Constitution, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared that 
there is little argument that the right to privacy is grounded in the 
concept of liberty featured in those documents, specifically in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
134
 After finding that the right of privacy was 
also guaranteed under and protected by the liberty clauses of the 
Tennessee Declaration of Rights,
135
 the Davis court proceeded to 
hold that the right of procreation was a vital part of an individual’s 
right to privacy.
136
 To support its reasoning, the court looked to the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma,137 which 
found the right to procreate to be “one of the basic civil rights of 
man.”138 The Davis court concluded that the right of procreational 
autonomy, no matter its ultimate constitutional boundaries, “is 
composed of two rights of equal significance – the right to procreate 
and the right to avoid procreation.”139 Finding procreational 
autonomy consistent with Tennessee public policy and federal 
judicial precedent, the Davis court applied a balancing test that not 
only recognized Junior and Mary Sue as equivalent gamete-
providers, but that also gave equal weight to the right to procreate 
and the right not to procreate.
140
  
What eventually tipped the balance for the Davis court was the 
burden of unwanted/forced parenthood on Junior.
141
 Donation of the 
pre-embryos, as Mary Sue requested, would, according to the court, 
rob Junior twice: not only would his procreational autonomy be 
defeated, any relationship with his offspring would be prohibited.
142
 
He also would suffer the psychological consequences of knowing a 
child was out there, possibly born to a couple that would later 
 
134. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598–99. The Davis court also cited Justice Brandeis’ opinion in 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), regarding the right to privacy as being 
“against the [power of] government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of 
rights and the most valued by civilized men.” Id. at 599. 
135. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600. 
136. Id. 
137. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
138. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600. 
139. Id. at 601. 
140. Id.  
141. Id. at 604. 
142. Id. 
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divorce.
143
 The court did allow that the result of the balancing test 
would have been closer if Mary Sue still sought to use the pre-
embryos herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any 
other reasonable means (including adoption).
144
  
However, perhaps the most lasting legacy of the Davis court’s 
decision is in fact the framework it laid out for future courts.
145
 
Taking its own advice and applying it to the facts of Davis, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court ordered that in the absence of an 
agreement between the former spouses, the clinic at which the pre-
embryos were stored should be allowed to follow its normal 
procedures for the disposal of surplus or unwanted pre-embryos 
unless conflicting with the opinion in this case.
146
  
In both Nahmani hearings, the Israeli justices recognized the 
value of Davis and Western legal tradition as a guide to how to 
proceed in this situation, but the final Nahmani II majority skewed 
the balancing test in favor of Ruth from the very beginning, thereby 
undermining the same premise of equality espoused by the Davis and 
Nahmani I courts. Both sides in the Nahmani case, recognizing that it 
was truly a situation without precedent and lacking in legislative 
guidance, took a subjective view of justice and relied on rights-based 
arguments and various combinations of contract principles to make 
their arguments. The result was that the Nahmani II majority opinions 
have a tendency to focus on the search for the “just” result, whereas 
the minority opinions seek to find some justification (or at least a 
useful interpretation) in the existing law.
147
 
In Nahmani I, Justice Tal set out what would become the 
majority view on rehearing.
148
 He focused on the non-absolute nature 
of the negative right (the right to non-parenthood).
149
 He argued that 
Daniel’s right could be “overridden by the liberty, dignity, privacy 
and autonomy of others.”150 Tal regarded the “balance of evils” as 
 
143. Id.  
144. Id.  
145. Id.; see also supra Part I.A. 
146. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604–05. 
147. See, e.g., Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 376 (Dorner, J.) (“Indeed, not every moral 
duty is a duty in law. But the law must lead to a just result.”); id. at 329 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., 
dissenting) (“[W]e are not operating in a vacuum. We have at our disposal the rich world of 
existing law with all its branches that affect the issue under discussion.”). 
148. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 49–62 (Tal, J., dissenting).  
149. Id. at 50. 
150. Id. 
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between the inconvenience of forced parenthood and infertility (aka 
the violation of a basic, fundamental right).
151
 For Tal, the sequence 
was clear: Daniel agreed to the procedure; Daniel changed his mind; 
ergo, Ruth’s rights trump Daniel’s.152  
Though the Davis court’s opinion was readily available and 
indeed cited by the justices in the first and second hearings, the 
Nahmani II majority failed to see symmetry between the rights of 
being a parent and not being a parent.
153
 For the Nahmani II court, 
the balance of rights discussion turned on human rights and ethics 
and not so much on individual liberty. Reasoning that the force of a 
yearning for a child is the most intense, the majority considered the 
ethical weight of the right to be a parent as being “immeasurably 
greater than” the weight of the right not to be a parent.154 Moreover, 
the right to be a parent should be recognized alongside the right to 
life as an independent basic human right.
155
 However, even Justice 
Tal conceded that existing authorities lacked clarity on this issue.
156
 
Undeterred, Justice Tal and the majority justices concluded that the 
right to be a parent should not be viewed simply as a derivative of the 
autonomy of the will, but as part of the basic right to life sanctified in 
Jewish history and in the history of mankind in general.
157
 In view of 
the intensity of the implicated emotions, the ethical weight of the 
right to be a parent trumps the right not to be a parent,
158
 or, as 
Justice Türkel concluded, the mere life potential of the fertilized ova 
immediately tipped the balance of rights in favor of Ruth.
159
 
 
151. Id. at 53. 
152. Id.  
153. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 359 (Tal, J.). 
154. Id. at 408 (Türkel, J.). 
155. Id.  
156. See, e.g., Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 61 (Tal, J., dissenting). Under Jewish law, the 
husband has a duty to give his wife a child if she wants one. Id. at 58. In the present case, 
although the difficulty of procreation originated with Ruth, Tal notes that Daniel knew of 
this difficulty, and therefore his consent again becomes an absolute moral obligation. Id. at 
60. 
157. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 407–08 (Türkel, J.). 
158. Id.  
159. Id. at 409. Justice Bach shared Türkel’s preference for the position of the person who 
wishes to grant life and bring a living being into the world; even if the scales of justice were 
balanced here, “just this thought would tip the scales.” Nahmani II, [1995-6] at 423 
(Bach, J.). Despite Türkel’s bold statement of “I choose life,” there can be agreement on the 
“point of no return,” or the moment where the wife’s control over her body and the embryos 
becomes absolutely paramount: implantation. Id. at 344 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting). 
Justice Kedmi notes that the balance is already shifting towards continuation and 
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The Nahmani II majority’s acknowledgment of Davis while 
arriving at the opposite result is particularly marked in those majority 
opinions, most notably that of Justice Dorner,
160
 which took a more 
practical and straightforward approach to the rights issue. Dorner and 
her colleagues first asked themselves whether the husband’s right not 
to be a parent, based on his ‘ownership’ of half of the genetic 
material of the ova fertilized with his sperm, really takes precedence 
over the right of Ruth, who also contributed half of the genetic 
material of these ova, to be a parent.
161
 Second, they asked 
themselves what effect the equality of the sexes had on the 
relationship of the parties to the fertilized ova.
162
 For Justice Dorner, 
equality of the sexes meant that Daniel and Ruth had equal status 
with regard to their relationship to the fertilized ova and that there 
was no reason to make a sex-based distinction with regard to the 
yearning for parenthood.
163
 Dorner’s balancing test incorporated the 
following factors: the current stage of the procedure (the more 
advanced, the greater the weight of the right to be a parent), the 
representations made by the parties, the expectations thus raised and 
 
preservation once fertilization has occurred, but even he agrees that the parties have a joint 
right and double consent prior to implantation. Id. at 403–04 (Kedmi, J.). It is also notable 
that no regional or international convention has granted an absolute right to life to a fetus, 
even a viable one. See Rhonda Copelon et al., Human Rights Begin at Birth: International 
Law and the Claim of Fetal Rights, 13 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 120, 120–26 (2005) 
(highlighting approaches to a “right to life” across multiple international and regional 
agreements). Therefore, one can easily see grounds for an international consensus that frozen 
embryos, which have not even developed into fetuses, do not have an independent absolute 
right to life. 
160. An interesting opinion that combines elements of Justices Tal and Dorner’s 
approaches while presenting a unique take is that of Justice Goldberg. Nahmani II, [1995-6] 
IsrLR at 388–402 (Goldberg, J.). Justice Goldberg’s conditional decision in favor of Ruth is 
a rational compromise. While concurring in the result, Goldberg found that both rights in 
play derive from the values protected by Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and 
are in fact in stalemate. Id. at 390. Goldberg notes that even the ubiquitous “reasonable man” 
cannot help. Id. at 393. Goldberg reverts instead to the “lesser-of-two-evils” method to find 
the just solution. Both infertility and coerced parenthood involve emotional harm. Daniel’s 
duties, mainly economic, may be mitigated by indemnification. Goldberg also adopted the 
reliance argument and the possibilities of alternative motherhood as factors. As a married 
woman, Ruth cannot freeze an ovum fertilized with the sperm of someone not her husband, 
and in any case she can no longer physiologically undergo another procedure. Id. at 400–02. 
161. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 376 (Dorner, J.). 
162. Id. at 382. 
163. Id. By contrast, Strasberg-Cohen declared that it was by principle of equality that the 
court should refrain from imposing parenthood. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 18 (Strasberg-
Cohen, J.). Both positions stem from an equally appropriate premise. The special status and 
the lifelong implications of parenthood lead not to the presumption in favor of the implanting 
spouse, but to equality of both spouses and the idea that parenthood should not be forced on 
an unwilling party.  
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any reliance (application of classic estoppel), and the alternatives that 
exist for realizing the right of parenthood.
164
 Therefore, even though 
the Nahmanis, like the Davises, were equivalent gamete-providers, 
their rights were not equal, and Justice Dorner concluded that the 
factors tipped in favor of Ruth.
165
 
However, Justice Strasberg-Cohen (now in the minority), 
adhering to the Davis court’s analysis, observed that the right to be a 
parent, while a basic right, did not impose an obligation on one’s 
spouse to help realize that right.
166
 She agreed with Daniel Nahmani 
and Junior Davis that parenthood should not be coerced by the legal 
system and that the procedure was based on joint parenthood.
167
 
Strasberg-Cohen also agreed with Justice Tal and the Davis court that 
the right to parenthood is not only derived from the right to individual 
autonomy, freedom, and dignity—also enshrined in the 1992 Basic 
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
168—but is also a “basic human 
right to which every person is entitled.”169 However, analogizing 
from a different area of the reproductive rights debate, she reasoned 
that, “just as a husband cannot oppose abortion by his wife, so a wife 
 
164. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 385 (Dorner, J.). Justice Mazza classifies the 
competing rights in Nahmani as a fundamental/general right (the right to be a parent) vs. a 
specific right (the right not to be a parent of these specific ova). Id. at 424–26 (Mazza, J.). 
The restrictions that the two parties want to impose are also classifiable, a quasi-general 
restriction on Ruth (probable infertility or inaccessible parenthood) and a specific limitation 
on Daniel (the imposition of unwanted parenthood of these specific ova). Id. at 439. Justice 
Mazza points out, however, that while both restrictions are serious, they are not equal. Id. 
Not only is a quasi-general restriction more serious than a specific restriction, but Ruth’s 
right is stronger, and the restriction on Daniel is less violative of his rights. Id. at 441. 
However, Mazza qualifies his preference for Ruth much as Justice Goldberg does, preferring 
a conditional grant subject to no financial demands on Daniel. Mazza argues that, should 
Ruth turn to Daniel with financial demands, it would put into doubt her good faith. Id. at 
443–44. 
165. Id. at 388 (Dorner, J.). 
166. Id. at 333–36, 354 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting). 
167. Id. at 333. The Attorney-General, in his opinion, argued that forced parenthood was 
contrary to public policy, legal policy, principles of equality between the sexes, and 
individual rights. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 10 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.). Justice Strasberg-
Cohan also notes that “[t]he desire to minimize State intervention in relationships within the 
family unit, whether directly or through the legal system, emphasizes the right of autonomy 
of this unit, which is protected against intervention both in the relationship between the 
family unit and the State and in the relationship between the members of the family unit inter 
se.” Id. at 16. 
168. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992 SH No. 1391 (Isr.).  
169. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 14 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.) (quoting CA 451/88 A v. 
State of Israel 44(1) IsrSC 330, 337 [1990] (Isr.)). 
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cannot oppose her husband’s demand to stop the fertilization 
proceedings.”170  
Interestingly, the Nahmani II majority, while prioritizing the 
biological link on behalf of Ruth, often ignored the 
biological/emotional implications of unwanted parenthood for 
Daniel, choosing instead to merely note the financial and property 
implications of parenthood. By contrast, Justice Strasberg-Cohen 
believed that coercion exists even if the resultant child would have no 
relationship with Daniel.
171
 President Barak also noted this crucial 
detail in his opinion:  
Ruth Nahmani is not merely asking to be a mother. 
Ruth Nahmani is asking to be the mother of the child 
of Daniel Nahmani . . . while Ruth does have a 
constitutional liberty to be a mother, she does not have 
an automatic constitutional right to be a mother to the 
child of Daniel Nahmani.
172
  
This is in stark contrast to the view of the majority, which 
believed that while the right to parenthood implicated the basic civil 
rights of man,
173
 the right to non-parenthood contained no inherent 
value.
174
 In fact, citing the Bible, Justice Tal asserted that taking 
away parenthood is akin to taking away one’s life.175 Squeezing the 
reasoning of Davis in support of his point, Tal argued that denying 
the interest of non-parenthood imposes undesirable burdens that are 
not the equivalent of taking a life.
176
 However, the Nahmani II 
majority harps on “justice” to a fault, losing the principle of equality 
of the sexes that multiple justices list as paramount in the law.
177
 
 
170. Id. at 17. 
171. Id. at 18 (“The coercion exists even if the desired child grows up with the mother 
without any relationship with the father who will live in another family unit, since the bond 
of parenthood cannot be severed.”). 
172. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 483–84 (Barak, President, dissenting). 
173. Id. at 359 (Tal, J.) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)). 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 361. 
176. Id. at 361–62. 
177. In view of the sheer number of opinions, Justice Dorner suggested the following 
categorical division among the justices: 1) an absolute preference for the spouse who does 
not want to be a parent (Justice Strasberg-Cohen in both Nahmani cases); 2) absolute 
preference in all circumstances for the right to parenthood (Justice Kedmi in Nahmani II); 
and 3) justice as a balance of the rights of the specific parties (Justice Tal, in both Nahmani 
cases). Id. at 382–84 (Dorner, J.). In her later article on the Nahmani case, Justice Dorner 
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In order to forge a solid basis for expanding the existing family 
planning international law framework,
178
 it is necessary to apply a 
narrowest grounds/broadest compromise approach to the dozen 
opinions involved here. The most practical framework would 
combine the idea of two equal rights
179
 with the application of a 
balancing test in the absence of agreement.
180
 The balancing test, 
slightly weighted toward the party desiring implantation, should 
include the following caveats: that the party desiring parenthood 
make no financial demands on the other party
181
 and/or it is the pro-
implantation party’s final shot at genetic or adoptive parenthood.182 
B. IVF Consent Agreements: Enforceable? 
Ideally, decisions as to the disposition of frozen embryos would 
be made by both spouses and with the consent of both. However, in 
the absence of consent, the spouse wishing to continue with 
implantation should be allowed to do so, with caveats. Everyone can 
agree that when spouses originally agree to any assisted reproductive 
procedure, their agreement is based on the foundation of a 
functioning married life and a joint future that includes the birth of a 
child desired by both spouses.
183
 Difficulties arise when the family 
unit and thus the main consent collapses, either through separation or 
divorce, before the joint goal is achieved. In these cases, such as 
Nahmani, a disposition agreement should already exist between the 
parties or uniform guidelines should dictate the presumptions in the 
absence of agreement. Informed consent requires an “awareness of 
the circumstances in which the consent will operate.”184 By its very 
nature, the IVF process embodies the consent of both spouses; 
 
addressed the multiplicity of approaches to justice advocated by members of the Nahmani II 
majority: (1) an absolute approach to justice (espoused by Justices Kedmi and Türkel); (2) 
justice as that which does the least harm (Justices Goldberg and Mazza); and (3) justice as a 
balance of the “rights and circumstances of each side” (Justices Tal, Dorner, and Bach). 
Dorner, supra note 116, at 5–6. 
178. See supra notes 5, 7–8 and accompanying text. 
179. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992). For a thorough discussion of 
this idea, see the opinions of Justice Strasburg-Cohen in Nahmani I and Nahmani II. 
180. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603–04; Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 355–73 (Tal, J.);  
id. at 373–88 (Dorner, J.). 
181. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 401 (Goldberg, J.); id. at 443–44 (Mazza, J.). 
182. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604; Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 361 (Tal, J.). Adoption 
is certainly a viable option, but it is rarely addressed by the courts.  
183. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 337–43 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting). 
184. Id. at 341. 
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without it, there is no possibility of beginning the fertilization 
procedure.
185
 
Despite the lack of an agreement in the Davis case,
186
 the 
Tennessee Supreme Court made a point of addressing the issue of 
cryopreservation/IVF agreements, recognizing that the situation in 
Davis (no disposition agreement) would be an outlier in the future.
187
 
The court clearly understood the unique situation it faced: no initial 
agreement, no agreement since, and no formula from the court of 
appeals as to what to do if the parties cannot reach an agreement in 
the future.
188
 For the Davis court, “establishing the locus of the 
decision-making authority in this context is crucial to deciding 
whether the parties could have made a valid contingency agreement 
prior to undergoing the IVF procedures and whether such an 
agreement would now be enforceable.”189 Dismissing both an implied 
contract and a one-party veto theory as the basis for its analysis, the 
court declared that frozen embryo disposition agreements should be 
“presumed valid and should be enforced as between the 
progenitors.”190 However, the court also recognized that “life is not 
static.”191 It therefore adjusted its rule to allow for mutually agreed- 
upon modifications that the court reasoned would protect the parties 
against some of the inherent risks of such agreements.
192
 However, in 
the absence of such an agreement, the court was clear that prior 
agreements should be considered binding.
193
 This presumption of 
enforceability, with room for mutual modification, would become 
 
185. Id. at 337. 
186. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598. Additionally, the Davises “were not asked to sign any 
consent forms. Apparently the clinic was in the process of moving its location when the 
Davises underwent this last round and, because timing of each step of IVF is crucial, it was 
impossible to postpone the procedure until the appropriate forms were located.” Id. at 592 
n.9. Unlike the majority and minority opinions of the Nahmani II court, the Davis court 
found no agreement between the Davises. Id. at 598.  
187. Id. at 597. Despite the court’s reluctance “to treat a question not strictly necessary to 
the result in the case,” it concluded such discussion was necessary for the future guidance of 
all parties to IVF procedures in Tennessee. Id.  
188. Id. at 598. 
189. Id. at 597. 
190. Id.  
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
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Davis’ primary legacy, cited and utilized by later courts (including 
Nahmani).
194
 
A presumption of enforceability is desirable for reasons ranging 
from clinical efficiency to the minimization of misunderstandings and 
the maximization of procreative liberty. First, the embryo inhabits a 
legal gray area between property and person, the ambiguity of which 
supports the need for an unambiguous contract.
195
 This status also 
helps to overcome the concerns of some courts of becoming too 
involved in what they consider “intimate questions inherent in the 
marriage relationship.”196 Second, the disposition agreements in 
question do not exist between the spouses but between the couple and 
the IVF clinic. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in observing that IVF 
is a widely-used procedure, recognized that there is a definite need 
for agreements between the participants and the clinics.
197
 Such an 
agreement is therefore analogous to a business transaction, an area in 
which explicit agreements are encouraged, contingencies explored, 
and intentions spelled out in writing in order to avoid costly litigation 
down the road.
198
 The New York Court of Appeals also noted the use 
of advance directives in healthcare that “minimize misunderstandings 
and maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the 
authority to make what is in the first instance a quintessentially 
personal, private decision.”199 The court went on to assert that written 
agreements provide a necessary certainty in the “effective operation 
of IVF programs.”200 Lastly, the freedom to contract is a well-
established principle that supports the presumptive enforceability of 
embryo disposition agreements.  
C. Consent and Estoppel 
In establishing an international framework premised on the 
enforceability of agreements between spouses as to the disposition of 
frozen embryos, countries should follow Davis and the Nahmani II 
 
194. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 21 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.); see also A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 
N.E.2d 1051, 1055–57 (Mass. 2000); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998). 
195. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594–97. The court concluded that the pre-embryos in 
question occupied an “interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their 
potential for human life.” Id. at 597. 
196. See, e.g., A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 158. 
197. J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001). 
198. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
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minority to avoid the emotional pitfalls of promissory or classic 
estoppel.
201
 The words “promise” and “representation” simply do not 
fit well with the special circumstances of spousal separation and 
embryo disposition. Furthermore, even if the grounds for estoppel 
were proven, the principal remedy is reliance damages, not the 
enforcement of an agreement.
202
 For the sake of consistency, an 
international framework should simply rely on the enforceability of 
the agreement, with the caveats already noted above for last-chance 
parenthood and mutual modification. 
Moreover, estoppel cannot replace consent, which is the true 
crux of the dispute and which goes back to the intentions of the 
parties.
203
 In fact, it is probably safe to assume that in most cases 
couples would believe that consent to IVF when the couple is 
together does not include consent to its continuation in case of 
separation. In Ruth’s case, she underwent the process in spite of the 
risks of the procedure, and likely would not have been daunted by the 
risk of a separation and refusal that did not exist at the time.
204
 In 
fact, as Justices Or and Zamir argued, there was no evidence in the 
record to show that the Nahmanis had ever considered the question of 
continuation of the procedure in case of separation.
205
 In sum, there 
was no representation upon which Ruth could rely.
206
 Lastly, the 
minority in Nahmani II noted that the Israeli Public Health 
Regulations
207
 and the recently enacted Surrogacy Law
208
 required 
continuing mutual consent for most medical procedures. Even Justice 
 
201. By contrast, the Nahmani II majority, leaning heavily on the reliance element of 
estoppel, had to contort the facts and the law to make its argument. According to Justice Tal, 
as articulated fully in Nahmani I, Daniel’s original consent was the promise, and that consent 
was to the final goal of having a child, not simply of starting the IVF procedure. Nahmani I, 
[1995-6] IsrLR at 61 (Tal, J., dissenting). Ruth relied on Daniel’s promise by going through 
the first part of the procedure, an irrevocable change in the wife’s situation. Id. at 57. Tal 
even found evidence of the modern reliance interest in Talmudic law in addition to citing 
Australian case law and the U.S. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Id. at 
54–56. Justice Bach also brought up “moral” estoppel, arguing that estoppel existed because 
at one time Daniel wanted a child and submitted to the IVF process with that goal in mind. 
Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 423 (Bach, J.). 
202. See, e.g., Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 42 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.). 
203. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 476–77 (Zamir, J., dissenting). 
204. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 42 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.). 
205. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 476 (Zamir, J., dissenting). 
206. Id. 
207. See Public Health Regs., supra note 81, at nos. 8(b)(3), 9, 14. 
208. The Surrogacy Agreement (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law was 
enacted on March 7, 1996. Justice Strasberg-Cohen discusses sections 2(1) and 5(c) of the 
new law on page 347 of Nahmani II. 
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Tal conceded that in an ideal world he would recommend joint and 
continuing consent, allowing the parties to know ab initio the 
consequences of their actions.
209
 It is this early awareness of each 
parties’ obligations that this Comment seeks to encourage in its 
proposed framework for an international consensus. 
Determining the terms of the parties’ “joint will” or “legitimate 
expectations” is of prime importance where there is no agreement, or 
if an existing agreement requires interpretation. In Nahmani II, 
Justice Tal argued that recognizing the legitimate expectations of the 
parties requires the law to recognize the emotional aspect of ART.
210
 
The Davis court and the Nahmani II minority also conceded the 
special nature of the parties’ agreement as well as the unique status of 
a frozen embryo (neither person nor property).
211
 Intentions are 
imputed to someone when there is no way of assessing the presumed 
intention of the parties; it can be imputed for considerations of justice 
or considerations of policy.
212
 Here, taking into account 
considerations of justice—including the balance of evils and the 
presence of the criteria for promissory estoppel—Justice Tal 
concluded that neither party should gain an unfair advantage and that 
“in the absence of explicit consent with regard to a case of separation, 
an intention should be imputed to the parties that no party can change 
his mind.”213 
Justice Strasberg-Cohen rightly criticized the majority’s rigid 
view of consent, which froze Daniel’s consent to the IVF procedure 
at the moment of fertilization.
214
 Daniel’s contribution (from 
choosing the surrogate mother to the financial and legal liabilities 
 
209. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 62 (Tal, J., dissenting). 
210. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 362 (Tal, J.). 
211. See supra note 195 and accompanying text; Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 339–40, 
347 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting); Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 20–22, 44–45. 
212. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 363 (Tal, J.). 
213. Id. at 363–64. In addition, several justices have analogized embryo disputes to 
abortion cases. From Israeli abortion law Justice Tal infers that “[w]hen not speaking of 
interference in her body, the woman is not entitled to destroy the embryo without her 
spouse’s consent; in exactly the same way, the man is not entitled to destroy the ova against 
the woman’s wishes,” and she is not entitled to destroy the ova against his wishes. Id. at 
369–70. Under Israeli law therefore, “the wife [should be] entitled to continue the 
implantation procedure, notwithstanding the husband’s opposition.” Id. at 370. As explained 
in his estoppel reasoning, under Jewish law the husband has an unenforceable obligation to 
his wife to help her bring children into the world. As Justice Tal explains, “The husband is 
liable to help, and he most certainly is not permitted to sabotage the process.” Id. at 372–73. 
214. Id. at 340 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting). 
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incurred from legal parenthood) is far from over.
215
 To support her 
argument that informed consent of both spouses at each stage of the 
procedure is required, Strasberg-Cohen cited the procedures and 
recommendations of several Western jurisdictions, including the 
United States.
216
 Within Israel, Strasberg-Cohen referred to the 1987 
Public Health (IVF) Regulations
217
 and the recommendations of the 
Aloni Commission.
218
 The former emphasized the need for spousal 
consent,
219
 while the latter supported the Davis approach.
220
 Even the 
Surrogacy (Agreements) Law of 1996 required written consent 
between the surrogate and the intended parents; implantation is the 
point of no return (until then, the consent of both parties to the 
procedure is required).
221
 According to Strasberg-Cohen, the final 
construction of the Surrogacy Law derived from the basic ethical 
 
215. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 39 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.). Strasberg-Cohen also made 
the argument that, even if the original consent could continue in the new circumstances, 
enforcement would be contrary to sections 3(2) and 3(4) of the Contracts Law because the 
law is not interested in forcing a relationship he does not want and because the personal 
elements contained in the agreement here are much greater than in any contract for personal 
service. Id. at 38–39.  
216. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 345 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting). 
217. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 22–23 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.). 
218. Id. at 24. The Aloni Commission was a “professional public commission” appointed 
by the Ministers of Justice and Health in June 1991 to “examine the question of in-vitro 
fertilization.” Id.; see also Waldman, supra note 27, at 83. 
219. Public Health Regs., supra note 81. 
220. Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 24 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.) (“‘[I]n the absence of joint 
and continuing consent, no use should be made of the fertilized ova that were frozen until 
the end of the freezing period agreed by the spouses but consent that was given at the 
beginning of the treatment shall be deemed to continue as long as neither of the spouses 
revokes it in writing . . . . [A] man or woman should not be forced to be a father or mother 
against their will, even if they initially consented to this.’”) (quoting REPORT OF THE 
PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC COMMISSION FOR EXAMINING THE ISSUE OF IN-VITRO FERTILIZATION 36 
(1994)). The Public Health Regulations are also notable for the restrictions on the scope of 
IVF. See Public Health Regs., supra note 81, arts. 6, 8; see also id. no. 11 (“A fertilized 
ovum shall be implanted only in a woman who intends to be the mother of the child.”); 14(b) 
(“Each act relating to IVF in a married woman may only be performed with her husband’s 
consent.”). 
221. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 347 (Strasberg-Cohen, J., dissenting). As in the United 
Kingdom, there is a five-year maximum for frozen embryo storage. See id.; Public Health 
Regs., supra note 81, no. 9. For additional discussion of the relevant Israeli policy 
surrounding mutual consent, see Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 24 (Strasberg-Cohen, J.); id. 
at 62 (Tal, J., dissenting); and Nahmani II [1995-6] IsrLR at 454-55 (Or, J., dissenting). Note 
that the Surrogacy Law, though discussed in Nahmani II, was enacted too late to be 
applicable to Nahmani II. 
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recognition that regarded “parenthood as a journey taken by two 
people together.”222 
A final element involving consent that was explicitly promoted 
by Nahmani and implicitly acknowledged by Davis is the 
requirement that any proposed agreement or contract requires good 
faith.
223
 Both Israel and the United States recognize this principle; it 
is notable that, despite the variations among the opinions, most of the 
justices, even in Nahmani, agree that the parties acted in good 
faith.
224
 Non-consent, like every legal act, requires good faith.
225
 
Good faith demands that a contract is given a meaning that is 
consistent with the joint intentions of the parties and with the basic 
principles of the legal system.
226
 “Love and friendship cannot be 
forced,”227 and not giving consent because the “feeling of love, 
companionship, mutual respect, partnership and affection has 
disappeared is not, in itself, bad faith.”228 Though the justices might 
not approve of Daniel’s behavior, this does not mean that he acted in 
bad faith; even the district court, which ruled in favor of Ruth, found 
that Daniel acted in good faith.
229
 
Therefore, a reasonable compromise position on contractual 
enforceability and consent would regard initial consent as non-
absolute in the absence of an agreement regarding embryo disposition 
in the event of separation or divorce. Where there is agreement, such 
agreement would, as desired by the Davis court, be presumed valid 
and enforceable.
230
 Consent to such an agreement would be binding 
and enforceable unless otherwise stipulated, and always mutually 
modifiable. 
 
222. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 347 (Strasberg-Cohen, dissenting). The “two people 
together” was a specific context unique to surrogacy at the time of the law’s enactment. IVF 
procedures are now open to all women no matter their sexuality or their marital status. Kraft, 
supra note 1; see also Waldman, supra note 27, at 68–69 (describing Israel’s “pro-natalist” 
culture). 
223. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 386 (Dorner, J.). 
224. Id. For additional discussions of “good faith” in Nahmani, see id. at 443–44 
(Mazza, J.); and id. at 486–87 (Barak, President, dissenting). 
225. Id. at 486 (Barak, President, dissenting). 
226. Id. at 487 (“Daniel’s non-consent should be examined in its context. We are dealing 
with an intimate relationship between the spouses. We are concerned with a relationship in 
which love, companionship, mutual respect, partnership and affection are an inseparable 
part.”). 
227. Id. 
228. Id.  
229. Id.  
230. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). 
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D. Post-Davis American Jurisprudence Supporting Contractual 
Enforceability 
The few developments in American jurisprudence since Davis
231
 
lend further support for the adoption of a presumption of 
enforceability for frozen embryo disposition agreements. Four of the 
five state supreme courts that have addressed divorce-related frozen 
embryo disposition since Davis have held that a disposition 
agreement between a couple and a clinic is presumptively 
enforceable.
232
 The basic holding and reasoning of Davis continued 
to hold, albeit with some important factual differences: (1) all five 
couples at odds in these cases had signed agreements with the clinic 
involved in the storage of their embryos;
233
 (2) in all but one case the 
two parties were also the progenitors of the genetic material;
234
 (3) at 
 
231. The issue has not appeared at all in Israeli Supreme Court jurisprudence since 
Nahmani. 
232. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) (holding that if donors 
cannot reach a mutual decision on disposition, then no use of the embryos can occur without 
the signed authorization of both donors); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) 
(holding consent form signed by both parties and clinic giving woman control of pre-
embryos after separation unenforceable); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001) (holding 
agreement regarding disposition of pre-embryos entered into at time of IVF enforceable, 
subject to each party’s right to change their mind up until the use or destruction of pre-
embryos); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E. 2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that agreements between 
gamete donors regarding disposition of pre-embryos should generally be presumed valid, 
binding, and enforceable); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) 
(holding that when a married couple gets divorced, if they could not reach a mutual decision 
on the disposition of their pre-embryos, they must petition the court for instructions). There 
are also five state appellate court cases, three of which involved the absence of an 
agreement. Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So.2d 465 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (holding pre-embryos to be 
the property of neither party absent a valid agreement between them); Reber v. Reiss, 42 
A.3d 1131 (P.A. Super. Ct. 2012) (ruling that the wife, in the absence of an agreement 
between the parties, and likely confronting last opportunity for parenthood, should be 
awarded frozen pre-embryos); In re Marriage of Nash, No. 62553-5-I, 2009 WL 1514842 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished decision upholding decision of trial court to rule on 
disposition of frozen pre-embryos in absence of a valid agreement between parties); In re 
Marriage of Dahl and Angle, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (holding valid agreements 
that indicate the clear intent of the parties regarding disposition of frozen embryos); Roman 
v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding prior agreement regarding disposition 
of frozen embryos enforceable).  
233. In the Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey cases, the “agreement” at issue was 
a consent form. In Litowitz, the parties had signed an egg donation agreement and 
cryopreservation agreement. Witten also dealt with an embryo storage agreement. In all cases 
except J.B., the wife asked the court for custody to implant, either herself or through a 
surrogate. The husbands all petitioned for the status quo, adherence to the agreement 
(donation to research in the case of Kass), or donation/adoption. In three cases (Witten, 
Litowitz, and Kass) the wife contested the agreement and in two cases (J.B. and A.Z.) the 
husband contested the agreement.  
234. The exception was Litowitz, in which the couple used an egg donor. 
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least three of the couples already had children via natural or assisted 
means;
235
 and (4) only one female progenitor sought to defend her 
last chance at genetic parenthood.
236
 
The analytical focus of these later cases also shifts from what 
was primarily a constitutional rights/interest-balancing discourse in 
Davis to a combination of contract enforceability and issues of public 
policy (e.g., whether a state could force unwanted parenthood on a 
person). These courts dismiss the status and best interests of the child 
argument entirely in favor of the contractual model arguments and a 
discussion of “forced unwanted parenthood” and public policy. The 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts added a dose of common sense 
mutual modification and contract promotion to the Davis-initiated 
premise of enforceability,
237
 while New Jersey’s Supreme Court 
inserted an evaluation of the progenitors’ preferences and a 
recognition of the trend towards the right not to procreate (autonomy) 
outweighing the right to procreate even in the face of prior agreement 
(the public policy argument).
238
 In the most recent state supreme 
court case, In re Marriage of Witten, the Supreme Court of Iowa 
summarized the pros and cons of what it saw as the three approaches 
to resolving such disputes that had appeared in American 
jurisprudence: (1) the contractual test (enforceable so long as not 
violative of public policy),
239
 (2) contemporaneous mutual consent,
240
 
and (3) a balancing test.
241
 The Iowa and New Jersey supreme courts 
also brought back an argument from Nahmani II: both courts allowed 
for a modified destruction order similar to the conditional grants 
proposed by Justices Goldberg and Mazza.
242
 
What can be gleaned from the later decisions is that American 
courts, when they choose to rule on intimate family matters such as 
the disposition of frozen pre-embryos, actually downplay the positive 
 
235. See Litowitz, 48 P.3d at 262; J.B., 783 A.2d at 710; A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1053.  
236. She lost on contractual grounds. Kass, 696 N.E. 2d at 179–82.  
237. See A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1056–59. 
238. See J.B., 783 A.2d at 717–20.  
239. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 776 (Iowa 2003); see also Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261; Kass, 
696 N.E. 2d 174; Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
240. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 777. This approach was also recommended by the 
Nahmani II minority. See supra Part I.B.2. 
241. In re Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 779; see also J.B., 783 A.2d 707; A.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051; 
Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588. All three cases, however, exhibited some internal inconsistencies. 
242. Goldberg and Mazza’s idea would permit embryo destruction unless the objecting 
party wished to pay the fees for continued storage until mutual agreement was reached. See 
Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 401 (Goldberg, J.); id. at 443–444 (Mazza, J.). 
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right to parenthood in favor of individual freedom not to procreate.
243
 
In contrast to Nahmani II, most American courts that have addressed 
the issue have ruled in favor of the party objecting to parenthood.
244
 
However, the American cases lack consistency, sometimes resorting 
to public policy rationales as a work-around to the actual issues in 
dispute. 
E. Obstacles to International Consensus: The Analytical Limits of 
Davis and Nahmani  
While the above analysis provides valuable insight into the two 
countries’ approaches to assisted reproductive technologies and their 
value as the potential foundation for an international framework, it is 
important to recognize the holes in both countries’ jurisprudence. 
Israel has yet to deal with an embryo disposition case involving a 
written agreement or an oral contract; in fact, it has not yet dealt with 
this issue in the context of the Israeli Surrogacy Law or even with a 
couple who is actually divorced.
245
 U.S. courts remain inconsistent in 
their enforcement of agreements executed by couples and clinics, and 
the issue has not reached the U.S. Supreme Court. Moreover, disputes 
over the disposition of frozen embryos remain within the jurisdiction 
of state courts, despite the Davis court’s discussion of constitutional 
rights such as the rights to privacy and procreational autonomy.
246
 
The scientific uncertainty regarding the length of viability of frozen 
 
243. As Professor Helene Shapo wrote, “[M]ost American courts have relied on 
biology . . . in order to locate decision-making authority over [frozen] pre-embryos. 
However, the courts have used biology in the negative sense by favoring individual 
autonomy and the right not to procreate over parental ties . . . .” Helene S. Shapo, Frozen 
Pre-Embryos and the Right to Change One’s Mind, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 75, 97 
(2002). 
244. See supra Part II.D. But see Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) 
(ruling that the wife, in the absence of an agreement between the parties, and likely 
confronting the last opportunity for parenthood, should be awarded frozen pre-embryos). 
245. A search of the available Israeli Supreme Court decisions and legal scholarship 
produced no evidence of additional jurisprudence on the matter. However, the Israeli 
legislature has made certain strides since Nahmani with the enactment of the Surrogacy 
Agreements Law and, after a ten-year debate, the enactment of a law permitting egg 
donation. See Dan Even, Knesset Approves Bill Easing Restrictions on Egg Donation in 
Israel, HAARETZ (June 7, 2010), http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/knesset-approves-
bill-easing-restrictions-on-egg-donation-in-israel-1.294755; Elana Sztokman, A Decade in 
the Making, Egg Donation Bill Passes Knesset, JEWISH DAILY FORWARD (June 8, 2010, 9:51 
AM), http://blogs.forward.com/sisterhood-blog/128609/a-decade-in-the-making-egg-donate 
on-bill-passes-kn/; Judy Siegel, Ova Donation Bill Set to Pass in Knesset, JERUSALEM POST 
(Feb. 21, 2010), http://www.jpost.com/HealthAndSci-Tech/Health/Article.aspx?id=169288. 
246. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598–603. 
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embryos
247
 also retains the potential for court cases to become moot, 
though the Davis court in particular did not address the mootness 
issue. Moreover, except for Kass, no state supreme court has properly 
dealt with a case involving a party’s last chance for genetic 
parenthood.
248
  
Several important arguments and additional political minefields 
also remain unexplored. Most notably, neither country inserted 
adoption into the debate; genetic parenthood or freedom from genetic 
parenthood remain the only promoted options while adoption remains 
an “unattractive”249 or invisible alternative. In addition, an approach 
like that taken by the Nahmani II majority (“developing the law”250) 
would likely lead to grumblings about legislating from the bench, 
certainly from within the United States if not from elsewhere. 
However, after considering the limits of the case, I agree with 
Northwestern Law Professor Helene Shapo’s statement that the 
Nahmani II court did not adopt an “arguably wiser position than that 
of the U.S.”251 While Israel, with its public encouragement of 
parenthood, may remain the more “family-friendly”252 regime, the 
fact that the Nahmani II court approached the case more as a matter 
of expectations and justice (favoring life) rather than building upon 
existing constitutional, contract, or other law, leaves the Israeli courts 
open to significant future challenges.  
CONCLUSION 
International law clearly needs to catch up with science. Medical 
research and surrogacy are global propositions, and access to IVF and 
 
247. See id. at 598; see also Susan Donaldson James, Eleven Years Later, Triplet No. 3 
Arrives, ABCNEWS (Dec. 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/eleven-years-triplet-
arrives-frozen-embryo-batch/story?id=12492208. 
248. Only the Pennsylvania Superior Court case, Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2012), addressed this issue. There is also a dispute currently winding its way through the 
Maryland courts. Bailey Henneberg, Maryland Woman Wins Custody of Frozen Embryos, 
GREENBELTPATCH (Jan. 7, 2013), http://greenbelt.patch.com/articles/judge-awards-mary 
land-woman-custody-of-frozen-embryos?national=patch&ncid=edlinkuspatc00000006; 
Tracee Wilkins, Judge Grants Stay in Divorced Couple’s Battle Over Embryos, 
NBCWASHINGTON (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Judge-Grant 
s-Stay-in-Divorced-Couples-Battle-Over-Embryos-186873792.html. 
249. See Nahmani I, [1995-6] IsrLR at 43–44. 
250. Nahmani II, [1995-6] IsrLR at 357 (Tal, J.). 
251. Shapo, supra note 243, at 102. 
252. Waldman, supra note 27, at 105. 
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cryogenic storage is no longer limited to a few “experiments.” Of 
course, increased access and increased opportunity provides new 
ammunition for marital disputes. This Comment, which seeks to 
propose certain guidelines regarding embryo disposition to which a 
majority of countries might be amenable, accepts the use of contract 
law as a reasonable compromise that avoids wading into the murky 
property/person “status” debate surrounding embryos. Contingency 
agreements in case of separation or divorce should be standard 
procedure at clinics who work with couples undergoing IVF 
treatments. The United States and Israel, as leaders both in assisted 
reproductive technologies and access to these technologies, should 
take the initiative to create a more comprehensive regulatory 
framework that would protect the rights of both parties in the couple 
and prevent excess litigation. However, the pace of change will 
remain slow so long as the United States retains its piecemeal and 
detached approach to assisted reproductive technologies and the 
international community continues to ignore the reproductive 
repercussions of divorce. 
